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INTRODUCTION 
In their sweeping and often-critical essay, “At the Intersection of Histories:  
Technology and the Environment,” Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr explore “those gray areas” 
where the history of technology and environmental history overlap (Stine and Tarr, 1998). One 
of those gray areas, they argue, centers on the automobile, a technology that has received 
considerable attention from both historians of technology and environmental historians. As 
they note, although historians of technology have focused for decades on automotive design 
and manufacture, on the planning and construction of highways, and on the larger interactions 
of the automobile, society, and culture, they have paid almost no attention to the automobile as 
an environmental problem and have made no efforts to develop a history of automobile 
emission control technologies. A similar charge could be leveled against historians of 
technology when it comes to the topic of the history of automotive safety. Although they have 
been slowly developing an outstanding literature on safety issues surrounding other 
technologies (Burke, 1966; Sinclair, 1974; Sinclair, 1980; Tebeau and Tarr, 1996; Aldrich, 
1997; Tarr and Tebeau, 1997; Usselman, 2000),1 historians of technology have not selected the 
automobile as the central focus of their research in spite of safety concerns having always 
attended the development, adoption, and diffusion of the automobile. At its most basic level, 
this research aims to rectify these shortcomings in the history of technology by providing 
scholarly research in the history of technology that focuses on the automobile, emission control, 
and safety. 
 This research aims for much more, however. We seek to study the phenomena of 
innovation and technological development under what experts in government regulation have 
                                                 
1 Some of the earliest and best literature in the history of technology focused on the steamboat, steam boilers, and 
the problems of railroad safety (Burke,1966; Sinclair1974; Sinclair,1980;Aldrich, 1977 and Usselman,2000). 
Other work has focused on the home as a site of safety problems (Tebeau and Tarr, 1996 and Tarr and Tebeau, 
1997). 
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termed “technology-forcing” regulations (government-imposed regulations that force industries 
and/or firms to develop new technologies in order to meet the goals, objectives, or standards 
imposed by those regulations). Thus, our research not only endeavors to contribute to the 
history of technology (and to studies of science and technology more generally), but it also 
seeks to address areas of scholarship that focus on the economics of technical change, on the 
management of technology, and on business, government, and technology policy (especially 
regulatory policy). We approach this by contrasting two intimately related case studies:  1. 
development of technologies for controlling (i.e., reducing or eliminating) automobile pollution 
under technology-forcing regulation, and 2. development of technologies to make automobiles 
safer under technology-forcing regulation. 
 Beginning in the 1960s, U.S. automobile manufacturers increasingly faced two sets of 
demands to change the products they sold. One set of demands centered on making cars safer 
and resulted in the passage of the Highway Safety Act of 1966, the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, and the Highway Safety Act of 1970. This last act created the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (as successor to the existing National 
Highway Safety Bureau established in 1967), which quickly mandated that automobile 
manufacturers provide “passive” protection technologies for front-seat occupants of new cars 
by July 1, 1973 and for all passengers by July 1, 1974.2 The second set of demands on 
automakers centered on lowering the harmful emissions from cars and contributed (in part) to 
the passage of the 1965 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Air Quality Act of 1967, the National 
                                                 
2 We focus on the Occupant Crash Protection Standard under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety and Standard and 
Regulations (FMVSS 208). FMVSS 208 specifies safety regulations for motor vehicles in terms of minimum 
safety performance requirements or items of motor vehicle equipment and encompass regulations for crash 
avoidance, crashworthiness, and post crash standards (http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/import/FMVSS/). 
Unlike most other standards that specify standards in terms of equipment used, FMVSS 208 represents a first step 
toward general performance-based standards for motor vehicle safety regulations; the standard was framed “in 
terms of the effects produced on an anthropomorphic dummy in frontal barrier crashes at 30 miles per hour” 
(Mashaw and Harsft 1990).   
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and, most importantly, the Clear Air Act [Amendments] of 
1970.  Implementation and enforcement of the 1970 Clear Air Act—including its provisions 
for 90% reduction in automobile tailpipe emissions of hydrocarbons (HC) and carbon 
monoxide (CO) by 1975 and nitrogen oxide (NOx) by 1976--fell to a new agency, also created 
in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency. 
These events constitute what is as close to an ideal “natural experiment” for the 
historian and analyst of technological change as one could ever want: one now-regulated 
industry (automobile manufacturers), two sets of federal laws “with teeth” (the Highway Safety 
Act of 1970 and the Clear Air Act of 1970), and two new federal agencies (the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency) to enforce 
those laws and to ensure that by the early-to-mid-1970s the industry’s cars would be both safer 
and less polluting. Although automobile safety and automotive emission-control technologies 
share, in one sense, the same political and regulatory milestone of 1970, although the same 
automobile makers were involved, and although the federal government was the principal 
regulator, the developmental paths in emission control and safety quickly diverged.  
Technological outcomes differed dramatically in spite of the automobile industry’s fierce 
opposition to both sets of regulation. Although neither as smoothly nor as quickly as originally 
envisaged by the Clear Air Act of 1970, the American automobile industry began producing 
cars with technologies embedded in them that controlled targeted pollutants and that met 
increasingly stringent standards for automobile emissions. In the case of safety, the American 
automobile industry and the regulators of safety moved in fits and starts, changed courses, and, 
experts have argue, failed to meet the regulatory goals envisaged by lawmakers in the 1960s. 
Why this difference in outcomes? 3  
                                                 
3 We know of only a few works that even raise this question, and certainly those works do not seek to answer it 
based on systematic empirical research focusing on the technologies and technological pathways that have been 
central to these two cases and on the respective (and overlapping) networks of actors who comprised the dramatis 
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Prior research on explaining the success and failure of technology-forcing regulations 
attributed differential regulatory outcomes to differences in political and regulatory processes 
involved in the implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of these regulations (Gerard and 
Lave 2002). They argue that the EPA had greater credibility than the NHTSA in enforcing 
standards: the EPA had to rely on an Act of Congress to grant delays to target dates, while 
NHTSA had the leverage to delay standards. Consequently, their study suggests that it was 
more difficult for automakers to fight against the EPA than the NHTSA, and eventually led to 
an unfavorable impact on implementation of safety regulations. 
Gerard and Lave (2002)’s analysis in explaining the differential regulatory outcome is based on 
their underlying judgment that the major automakers were able to develop suitable 
technologies within the time period given by the technology-forcing mandates.4 However, we 
believe that mere introduction of system does not fully capture technological complexity, 
especially when the development technological system requires collaborative efforts between 
the component suppliers and automakers. For more accurate comparison of the two 
technological solutions, technology should be examined in greater details and should not just 
be treated as a “black-box.”  
Our methodological approach in this research is first to tackle this question by 
empirically examine the statistical relationships between innovative output (patent counts) and 
                                                                                                                                                          
personae of these two cases. Most studies have sought to argue the case of regulatory failure—either from a 
politically conservative perspective or from a politically liberal perspective.  One work that seeks to answer this 
question from a still-different perspective is that of our CMU colleagues David Gerard and Lester Lave (both of 
whom are formally trained in economics) (Gerard and Lave, 2002). Their analysis of the differences in outcomes 
of these automobile-related technology-forcing regulations identifies differences in the implementation, 
monitoring, and enforcement of these regulations as the major factor, but it devotes no attention to the actual 
processes by which technological innovation occurred, the interaction among automakers and suppliers, and the 
R&D and capability-building activities carried out or supported by both the auto industry and the regulatory 
agencies themselves. 
4 Auto industry successfully introduced catalytic converters and airbag systems by 1975 and 1973 respectively. 
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lagged regulatory stringency. Statistical tests would help us determine whether the onset of 
technology-forcing regulations were effective in inducing innovation in automobile emission 
control and safety technologies. More importantly, we would be able to compare statistical 
findings from two cases and analyze auto industry’s differential reactions to technology-forcing 
regulations for the development of emission control and safety technology.1 Our previous 
research with automobile emission control suggests that the technology-forcing regulation was 
effective in driving innovation in automobile emission control (Lee, 2005; Lee et al., 2004). 
Using successfully applied patents as a measure of innovation both in automobile emission 
control and safety technologies from 1970 to 1998, the focus of this article is to expand upon 
our previous study in automobile emission control; and to compare and contrasts statistical 
results from two cases of technological development under the technology-forcing regulations.  
This article is organized as follows: the next section describes theoretical background 
for the technology-forcing regulations and examples of recent research that examined the 
effectiveness of technology-forcing regulations on innovation. The following section discusses 
the historical context for automobile emission control and safety regulation. The paper then 
discusses the methods used to develop patent dataset and detailed descriptions of analyses used. 
The final section discusses the findings of statistical analyses and concludes with a discussion 
of principal findings regarding the influence of the technology-forcing regulations on 
innovation and firms’ differential reactions to automobile emission control and safety 
regulations. 
TECHNOLOGY-FORCING REGUALTION IN THEORY 
 Technology-forcing regulations belong to what have been dubbed “command-and-
control” policies.  Command-and-control policies are seen as an alternative to so-called 
“market-based” approaches, though in some instances the distinction is not always crystal clear. 
Command-and-control regulations set uniform standards for firms to meet, typically using two 
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different approaches: performance-based regulations (or performance standards) and 
technology-based regulations (or technology standards). Performance-based regulations allow 
firms to meet regulatory standards or objectives using the least-costly means, whatever the 
technology or approach.5 Technology-based standards mandate that particular technological 
avenues or approaches be taken to meet the objectives. Technology-based standards can be 
justified under circumstances where information asymmetries exist between consumers and 
manufactures (Leone, 1999). It would cost consumers less for regulators to require that firms 
adopt a specific technology or technological pathway to meet the regulatory objective than for 
the firms to explore and develop different options to meet those objectives. Such technology-
based standards can be problematic, however, if regulators rely only on available, “off-the-
shelf” technologies. Even under “best-available-technology” standards, which in theory call for 
firms to upgrade regularly to improved technologies, firms have little incentive to innovate and 
move the technology forward because they are not generally rewarded financially for investing 
in R&D, innovation, and adoption of improved technologies to meet or exceed the goals 
established by regulators (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2003).6 
Technology-forcing regulations can be implemented using either performance-based or 
technology-based standards. Under technology-forcing regulations, firms can be required to 
meet performance levels that are not considered to be feasible using current technologies, or 
they can be required to adopt specific technologies or technological pathways that have not 
been fully developed but which experts believe will, when perfected, achieve the regulators’ 
                                                 
5 As Robert Leone (Leone, 1999) points out, however, “Analysts are also aware that sometimes the practical 
consequences of setting a performance standard is to set a de fact technology standard because the performance 
requirements are based on a prototype technology. . . .”  For more general literature on the theory of technology-
forcing regulations, (Crandall and Lave, 1981; Breyer, 1982; Leone, 1986; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; 
Crandall et al., 1996) 
6 As Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2003) note, however, firms might receive public recognition for their efforts.  
(This article provides a nearly-state-of-the-art review of how economists conceptualize regulation and the 
incentives to innovate.) 
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goals. Thus, firms are forced to improve those particular technologies or pursue R&D in those 
mandated technological pathways to the point of satisfying regulatory standards or objectives 
(Jaffe, Newell and Stavins, 2002). Importantly, although both approaches can be designed to 
force innovation, theoretically the outcome could be entirely different. Unlike firms operating 
under technology-based standards, firms operating under performance-based standards have 
leeway in achieving the goal with any technologies available or any they might invent (and, 
obviously, they have adequate incentives to do so at the lowest cost to them).   
Although there is considerable debate among economists about the relative efficiencies 
of market-based instruments versus command-and-control regulations (some of it ideologically 
driven), technology-forcing regulations are generally known or acknowledged to be successful 
in driving technological innovation.7 Development of substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) is one of the most often-cited success stories of technological innovation in response to 
technology-forcing regulations. Banning the use of halogenated chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) 
from aerosol applications by the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Environmental 
Protection Agency under the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Montreal Protocol resulted 
in two innovations: the development of non-fluorocarbon propellants and new aerosol pumping 
systems that are cheaper than the ones they replaced (Ashford, Ayers and Stone,, 1985; 
McFarland, 1992; Parson, 2003). Also, as the work done by Taylor (2003), the development of 
increasingly effective, efficient, and less-costly flue gas desulfurization systems to remove SO2 
emissions from coal-fired electric power plants provides another example where technology-
forcing regulations—the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1970 and the1971 New Source 
Performance Standards--stimulated innovation (Rubin et al., 2002; Taylor, Rubin and 
Hounshell, 2003; Rubin et al., 2004b). Finally, research by Jaegul Lee has shown similarly how 
the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1970 led the automobile industry (the car makers and their 
                                                 
7 For example, compare the findings of Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002) with René Kemp (Kemp, 1997). See 
also Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
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suppliers) to increase greatly their innovative activity in emission control systems (Lee et al., 
2003; Lee, 2004). 
In spite of these successes, the cost and availability of technology remain as primary 
sources of uncertainty in adopting technology-forcing regulations (Miller, 1995; Kemp, 1997). 
Regulators must have sufficient knowledge of the technologies or technological pathways that 
are to be “forced”--and also be able to assess accurately the innovative capacity of the target 
industry—in order to set the stringencies of performance standards such that they will indeed 
stimulate innovation and the development of new technologies, while reducing risks associated 
with regulatory uncertainties. Risks involved with regulatory uncertainties include forcing the 
development of technologies that become unnecessarily costly or fail to meet regulatory 
objectives.  
 
TECHNOLOGY-FORCING REGULATIONS IN THE U.S, AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
Regulatory Context 
Automobile Emission Control: The Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970 and the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act in 1966 are two regulations that adopted the technology-forcing approach in 
achieving regulatory goals. Realizing the need to establish a specific federal governmental 
agency with pollution abatement authority, Congress passed amendments to the Clean Air Act 
(CAAA) in 1965 and authorized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to 
set automotive emissions standards (Lave and Omenn 1981). The newly created Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) specified 90% reductions in the 1970 levels of HC and CO emissions 
by 1975. It also required 90% reductions of 1971 NOx levels by 1976 (White 1982). These 
standards can be translated as 0.41, 3.4 and 0.4 grams per mile for HC, CO and NOx, 
respectively. However, automobile manufacturers mounted serious opposition, and the 
requirements were delayed several times. In 1973, intermediate emission standards were set for 
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the 1975 model year. The 90% emission reduction requirement for HC was delayed until 1980, 
and the requirements for CO and NOx were delayed until 1981 by the 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (1977 CAAA) (White 1982). The 1977 CAAA also reduced the NOx emission 
requirement to 1.0 g/ mile.  
 No further increases in the stringency of emission reduction requirements followed 
until the late 1980s. California passed its own Clean Air Act in 1988, which required reductions 
of 1987 levels of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and NOx by 55% and 15%, respectively 
(NESCAUM, 2000). Following California, Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990 (the 
1990 CAAA), requiring reductions in the 1990 levels of HC and NOx of 35% and 60%, 
respectively, by 1994 (Tier I standard) (NESCAUM, 2000). The EPA finalized even more 
stringent standards in 1999 to be phased in between 2004 to 2009 (Bertelsen 2001). These 
“Tier II” standards are similar to California’s LEV II (Low Emission Vehicle II ) program 
standards adopted in 1998. They require reductions in HC and CO emissions of 98% and 95%, 
respectively, compared to uncontrolled 1965 automobile (NESCAUM, 2000). 
The National Low Emission Vehicle (NLEV) program emerged between the imposition 
of Tier I and Tier II standards. Its goal was to adapt California’s LEV program and apply it 
throughout the Northeast Ozone Transport Region (EPA 1997). Under NLEV, manufacturers 
had the option of complying with the program, which was more stringent than Tier I standards. 
Once manufacturers committed to the program, they would be required to meet the standards in 
the same manner as other federal emission requirements (EPA 1997). Nevertheless, they agreed 
to comply with the tighter NLEV standard because the EPA agreed to provide regulatory 
stability and to reduce regulatory burdens on manufacturers by harmonizing federal and 
Californian standards (EPA 1997). The NLEV program continued through 2003 and was 
replaced afterward by the Tier II program (Bertelsen 2001). 
Automobile Safety: The 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) and subsequent motor 
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safety acts provide another example where regulation adopted a technology-forcing approach.  
Seat belts and shoulder harnesses were available on only 77-80 percent of motor vehicles by 
1970 and only 25-30 percent of motorists were known to wear seat belts (Mashaw and Harfst 
1990). To address this automobile safety concern, John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, 
approved an advance notice of a proposed Rule 208 from NHSB in 1969, requiring that safety 
criteria stated in Rule 208, covering occupant crash protection, be met by a “passive restraint” 
system instead of an active system such as seat belts employed by drivers and passengers 
themselves (Graham 1989).  More specifically, the standard mandated that the anticipated 
passive restratin system--airbags that inflate upon crash--would not inflict certain “injuries” on 
a 5’9” dummy in a frontal barrier crash at any speed up to and including 30 mph and frontal 
angles up to 30 degrees (NHTSA 2001; Safety_Forum 2004). NHTSA issued its final ruling in 
1970 that passive protection systems be implemented by July 1, 1973 for front seat occupants 
and July 1, 1974 for all seating positions. John Volpe’s public statements in 1969 made clear to 
the industry that inflatable restraints were meant to be an airbag system (Graham 1989). See 
Table I, “Key Legislative Histories for Automobile Emission and Safety Control,” for a quick 
view of the parallels and departures in the regulatory histories of these two “forced” 
technologies. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Firms’ Differential Reactions to Technology-Forcing Regulations 
What is interesting about the 1970 CAA and the 1966 MVSA regulations is that 
regulatory outcomes were different. The history of the development of emission control 
technologies for automobiles reveals that the 1970 CAA led to the introduction and 
implementation of emission control technologies for automobiles in the 1970s (Mondt 2000; 
NESCAUM 2000). Resistance to the 1970 CAA from automobile manufacturers was severe.  
Lee Iacocca, Executive Vice President of Ford, made a statement to the press in 1970 in which  
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he claimed that the amendments to the Clean Air Act could do “irreparable damage to the 
American economy [which] exemplifies automakers’ resistance to the regulation” (Iacocca 
1970).  Nevertheless, the 90% pollutant reduction requirement in automobile emissions 
eventually led the auto industry to come up with catalytic converters designed for automobiles 
(Mondt 2000; Lee, et al., 2003). Figure 1 shows federal automotive emission standards for the 
period 1970 to 2004 and the time at which emission control technologies for automobiles were 
introduced. The phasing in of more stringent emission control standards drove innovation in 
emission control technologies: oxidation catalysts in 1975; three-way catalysts in 1980, and 
thermal management and onboard diagnostic systems in 1994. Further, advanced catalyst 
technologies, such as high-density and hexagonal cell-structured catalyst support, and 
advanced engine control systems, such as electronic exhaust gas recirculation and fuel injectors 
with improved fuel atomization, are being developed to satisfy the stringencies of the Tier II 
standards (Bertelsen 2001).   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Unlike technology-forcing on emission control, technology-forcing on passive restraint 
systems was not as successful (Graham 1989; Gerard and Lave 2002). After NHTSA mandated 
its rule on passive restraints in 1970, GM introduced the airbag to its Chevrolets in the 1973 
model year for field testing. One thousand Chevrolets had airbags installed (Graham 1989; 
Gerard and Lave 2002). GM further ordered 100,000 of Eaton Corporation’s airbag sensor 
systems and started to offer airbags as an option for some of its 1974 models (Graham 1989). 
However, GM withdrew from its airbag program by 1976 and stopped offering airbags in 1977. 
Ford postponed adopting airbag systems for their models in favor of interlock technology, 
which was also approved by NHTSA as an alternative to a passive-restraint safety device in 
October 1971. The interlock system is the technology that is designed to prevent automobiles 
from starting when drivers or passengers do not buckle up. GM’s first introduction of airbags 
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from 1974 to 1976 ended up selling only 10,000 units, in spite of GM’s technical leadership in 
airbag systems. Considering that vehicles equipped with airbags were not required also to 
contain the unpopular starter-interlock system, the sale of only 10,000 units is remarkably low. 
GM joined the rest of the automakers and turned against the passive-restraint regulation after 
its failure in promoting airbags.   
Airbags reappeared in automobiles about 15 years after their first introduction in 1973.  
Chrysler first adopted airbags as standard equipment in all its domestic cars in 1988. Other 
manufacturers such as Ford also started installing airbags in their models in 1989.  According 
to Graham (1989), the automakers’ decision to offer airbags in the late 1980s was driven 
largely by market forces rather than by technology-forcing regulation (Graham 1989). 
Automakers started to pay greater attention to safety as related to customer satisfaction and 
sensed that the market was increasingly willing to pay an additional price for enhanced safety. 
 
METHODS 
We carry out empirical studies of technology-forcing regulations and technological 
development by performing systematic analyses of innovative activity over time (as measured 
by patents) and correlate such activity with government actions, including regulation. The 
methods that we have employed in patent counting, in which we use not only class-based 
searches but also key-word searching and subsequent cleaning of irrelevant patents, have 
allowed us to analyze how innovation in what we call “environmental and safety technologies” 
proceeds under technology-forcing regulation. We further carry out a rigorous comparative 
analysis of the patterns of innovation in both automobile emission control and safety 
technologies as they relate to the anticipation, establishment, and enforcement of technology-
forcing regulations and later modifications (sometimes increased stringencies, sometimes 
relaxation of previously promulgated stringencies).   
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Data 
 
Patent Database: We use successfully-applied-for patent counts as a measure of 
innovation activities. Patent counts are known as imperfect measures of innovative outputs 
(Griliches 1990; Archibugi and Pianta 1996; Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998). Not all 
inventions and/or innovation are patented, and quality of individual patents varies quite widely 
(Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998; Popp 2005). Popp (2005, pg. 214) argued that results of 
patent research should, thus, be interpreted “as the effect of an ’average‘ patent, rather than any 
specific invention.” Nevertheless, patent statistics have been extensively used by academics 
studying technological changes (e.g. Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Trajtenberg 2001; e.g. Popp 2002; 
Popp 2006). One of the biggest advantages of using patent data is that it offers an abundant 
quantity of data complete with organizational and technical details (Lanjouw, Pakes and 
Putnam, 1998). Also, patent data allows construction of a time-series database (Popp 2003).  
We developed relevant patent sets using patent data from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). We employed abstract-based keyword search methods in addition 
to using more conventional patent class-based searching methods. Our purpose in adopting 
abstract-based keyword search is to strengthen the representativeness of our patent database in 
automobile emissions control technologies. Patent classifications tend to reflect the 
technological nature of the inventions; thus, any complex technological system that possesses 
multiple subsystems, such as automobile emissions control technologies, likely belong to 
multiple patent classifications. Consequently, relying only on patent classifications alone runs a 
risk of creating a patent database that contains patents that belong to the searched patent class 
but are not necessarily related to the technological system of interests. For example, an 
inventor may patent his or her invention for the use of a catalyst for pollution control 
specifically designed for an electric power plant, but that particular patent may belong to the 
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same patent class as other catalyst patents invented for automobile applications. For a similar 
reason, relevant patents of interests may also belong to other patent classes not captured by a 
researcher. Abstract-based keyword search allows researchers to double check their search 
findings under patent class-based search approach, and it enables them to identify potentially 
relevant patents not found under class-based search.  
For automobile emission control technologies, we selected seven different keywords for 
an abstract-based keyword search: catalytic converter, emission, automobile, catalysts, 
pollution, exhausts, and engine. These keywords were then permuted to search the U.S patent 
database electronically, yielding a preliminary set of potentially relevant patents. We eliminated 
duplicate patents, and screened for relevant patents by reading abstracts of searched patents. 
Sometimes it was necessary to examine the “Assignee” and “Claims” portions of the patent 
because catalytic converter technologies can be related to non-automobile technologies. For the 
class-based search, we adopted patent subclasses representing catalytic converter technology 
from prior patent studies on catalytic converter technology (Campbell and Levine 1984). The 
process for obtaining relevant patents using class-based searching was similar to that of 
abstract-based keyword search. We used patent application date rather than patent grant date to 
reflect more closely the timing of inventors’ propensity to patent, thereby avoiding vagaries 
involved in patent-granting processes (Griliches 1990). 
We identified a total of 2,108 successfully-applied-for automotive emissions control 
patents by firms for the period between 1968 and 1998. Major patent classes/subclasses 
representing automotive emissions control technologies found are listed in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 For automobile safety technologies, we used 15 different keywords for abstract search: 
airbag, seatbelt, seat, fuel, impact, signal, transmission, brake, steering, window, head restraints, 
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bumper, glass, tire and theft.8 We pursued similar steps to identify relevant patents in safety 
technologies: identified keywords were permuted to search the U.S patent database 
electronically, and searched patents were screened to generate a set of relevant patents. Total 
number of identified patents in automobile safety technologies is 6,357 for the period 1968 to 
1998. Major patent classes/subclasses for safety technologies are listed in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Results of our patent searches are shown in Figure 2 (note that the Y-axis contains 
separate scales for the two technologies). Patenting in safety technology is found to be 
significantly higher than that of emission control technologies, yet the overall pattern in 
patenting activities in both technologies share remarkable similarities. Patenting in both 
technologies increased during the 1970s and 1990s and declined noticeably in the 1980s.9 In 
order to provide a detailed accounting of technological evolution at a subsystem level,10 we 
disaggregated patenting activities in both emission control and safety technologies into four 
main sub-technology categories (Figure 3).    
[Insert Figure 2 & 3 here] 
 
Expenditure Estimates: We used cost estimates for automobile emission control and 
safety devices as the compliance cost data. For automobile emission control devices, cost data 
came from number of different sources that include the EPA (1990) and the California Air 
Resource Board (CARB 1996) instead of using the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditure 
                                                 
8 Keywords used for search are selected based on the safety technologies covered under the Federal Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). 
9 We suspect that innovation in the auto industry is, in general, sensitive to regulatory environments. Our 
subsequent statistical analysis shows that heightened regulatory pressures in the 1970s and 1990s, and the 
presence of anti-regulation sentiments during the Reagan administration in the 1980s relate significantly with the 
amount of innovative activities as measured by patenting. 
10 Complex technological systems typically consist of hierarchically structured subsystems. See L. Rosenkopf and 
A. Nerkar (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 1999). 
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(PACE) surveys. PACE data is inadequate for our study as we focus on specific technologies. 
Moreover, PACE data possesses many shortcomings as a measure of regulatory stringencies 
and may fail to capture potential links between regulations and the performance of consumer 
products such as auto-emission standards (Jaffe and Palmer 1997). 
EPA’s own study (EPA 1990) provides aggregated cost estimates for emissions control 
systems from 1972-199311 that include: evaporative emissions canisters from Model Year 
(MY) 1972, high altitude emissions controls from MY 1984, catalytic converters beginning 
MY 1975, exhaust gas recirculation units for MY 1973-1974, and air pump units for MY 1970-
1974 (EPA 1990; McConnell, Walls et al. 1995). Analytical procedures and assumptions used 
for calculations can be found in McConnell et al.’s Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 
(McConnell, Walls et al. 1995).12 (White 1982; Wang, Kling et al. 1993; Crandall, 
Gruenspecht et al. 1996) 
Notable increases in device costs occurred in 1975 as industry introduced oxidation 
catalysts to satisfy intermediate emission standards. Moreover, there is a steep increase in cost 
estimates from 1980 until 1984. This increase in costs seems to capture associated costs of 
introducing more advanced three-way catalysts with electronic loop control. EPA’s 1990 study 
(EPA 1990) reveals that it cost an additional $746 per vehicle to achieve 90% reductions of 
tailpipe emissions from pre-1970 emission levels. Further study by the EPA using the data from 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the cost of emission control systems further 
increased due to the phase-in of the Tier I standards in 1994 (Anderson and Sherwood 2002). 
The Tier I standards, which phased-in in 1994 due to the enactment of the Amendments of the 
Clean Air Act in 1990, caused an additional cost of approximately $97 (Anderson and 
                                                 
11 EPA’s study report (EPA 1990) that the costs of device remain constant after 1984. This research assumes that 
the costs of devices remain constant until the phase-in of more stringent Tier 1 standards in 1994.  
12 McConnell et al.’s study incorporates The Survey of Current Business by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) and studies by White (1982), Crandall, et al. (1996), and Wang, Kling and Sperling, (1993).  
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Sherwood 2002).  
Cost data for automobile safety devices for passenger cars, 1968 – 2002, came from 
NHTSA’s 2004 report (NHTSA 2004). As a part of NHTSA’s on-going evaluations of the 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) since 1975, it published a report on the life-
saving benefits and costs for a substantial “core” group of safety technologies for passenger 
cars. The “core” group of safety technologies includes: 1) Dual master cylinders (FMVSS 105), 
2) Energy-absorbing steering assemblies (FMVSS 203/204), 3) Safety belts (FMVSS 208), 4) 
Front airbags (FMVSS 208), 5) Side door beams (FMVSS 214), and 6) Roof crush strength 
(FMVSS 216).13  
 
Our approach in this paper is first to examine potential statistical linkage between 
innovative activities and regulatory stringencies embedded in the series of technology-forcing 
regulations. We then attempt to infer any new insights from regression results regarding firms’ 
innovative behavior under regulatory pressures. Finally, we assess the effectiveness of 
technology-forcing policy instruments in stimulating technological change. 
 
Model  
We use a negative binomial specification to analyze quantitatively the impact of 
regulation on innovation. The negative binomial model accounts for both the count nature of 
the patent data and repeated time series cross-sectional observations —panel data (Hausman, 
Hall et al. 1984). In this analysis, we control for likely errors involved with patents as 
innovative outputs by using firm-level patenting activities instead of aggregated industry-level 
                                                 
13 The cost report excludes any safety technologies that were introduced on a voluntary basis, introduced well 
before NHTSA’s regulatory process or that of other government agencies, and those that did not result in a cost 
increase. Refer to NHTSA (2004) for more detailed description of NHTSA’s categorization of “core” and 
excluded technologies. 
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patenting activities and time dummies. A conditional mean specification for the negative 
binomial function is as follows: 
( | , , )t t t tE FirmsPatents ComplianceCosts TotalAutoPatents μ
 0 1 2{ *log( ) * }t t tExp ComplianceCosts TotalAutoPatentsτβ β β μ−= + + + .  
where t represents years, FirmsPatents is successful U.S. patent applications in year t by 
patenting firms for either auto emission control (PATENT_EMISSION) or auto safety 
(PATENT_SAFETY), and ComplianceCosts represents regulatory compliance costs measured 
by estimated total expenditures on emission control and safety devices. TotalAutoPatents is the 
total innovation activity in automotive technologies, and its inclusion in the equation ensures 
that results obtained for patenting activities in emissions control technologies (or safety 
technology) are not just a reflection of an overall trend in innovations in automotive 
technologies. We use the United States Patent Classification (USPC) index to estimate overall 
patenting activity in automotive technologies. Subclasses listed under “Automobile” in the 
USPC index and Class 180 (Motor Vehicles) were selected, and patents applied under these 
subclasses were counted from 1968 to 1998. We also built in lag structure18 for expenditures to 
the model. We expect firms to invest in R&D prior to the phase-in regulatory stringency as 
firms, especially in the auto industry, are known to have long product lead times (Clark and 
Fujimoto 1991).  
In order to examine the impact of regulatory pressures on technological change more 
closely, we ran similar regressions as discussed above using patenting activities in major 
subsystems as the dependent variable: catalysts and electronic feedback control for automobile 
emission control technologies and airbag and seatbelts for automobile safety technologies. 
Subsystem level analysis permits examination of technological change at a finer level. For 
                                                 
18 We use two lag structures – one- and two-year lags – for expenditures. 
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example, according to the history of the development of automobile emission control, the auto 
makers and specialty chemical firms focused on introducing emission-reducing catalysts in the 
early 1970s. Once they successfully introduced catalysts in 1975, their focus of innovation 
gradually shifted to electronics that enabled them to monitor and control air-to-fuel ratios 
required for the operation of more advanced three-way catalysts. We expect that by separately 
running regressions on patenting activities of each major subsystem, we can examine the 
impact of regulatory pressures on innovation more precisely. 
 We also design another model specification to test for whether stringencies implicit in 
“technology-forcing” regulations caused U.S. firms to become more innovative compared to 
foreign competing firms in the U.S. market. We use patenting activities of U.S. firms in our 
patent database as a dependent variable and adopt patenting activities of foreign firms as an 
additional control variable. 
( | , , , , )t t t t t tE USPatents ComplianceCosts TotalAutoPatents MarketShareForeignFirms ForeignPatents μ
  0 1 2{ *log( ) *t tExp ComplianceCosts TotalAutoPatentsτβ β β−= + +   
    3 4* * }t t tMarketShareForeignFirms ForeignPatentsβ β μ+ + +   
where USpatents is the patenting activities of the U.S. firms in the patent database, and 
ForeignPatents is successful U.S. patent applications by foreign firms. Inclusion of the 
ForeignPatents variable is designed to control for the rate of foreign patenting in auto emission 
control. MarketShareForeignFirms is aggregated market share held by foreign assemblers in 
year t. We acknowledge that MarketShareForeignFirms could be a crude measure for 
competitive market pressures for U.S. firms since U.S. component suppliers may have 
collaborated with foreign automakers, such as Toyota and Honda. Yet, historical accounts of 
the development of automobile emission control systems in the U.S. reveal that U.S. 
automakers were engaged principally with major U.S. catalyst- and substrates-producing firms, 
such as Engelhard and Corning, rather than foreign suppliers (Doyle 2000).          
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among variables used in the 
analysis. We first begin our discussion by examining the significance of key explanatory 
variables. We also closely observe any systematic patterns in the time dummy coefficients that 
correspond to stringencies embedded in regulatory events (e.g. 1970 CAAA and/or 1990 
CAAA) over time. We then separately examine and compare regression results of key 
subsystems’ patent sets: catalysts and electronic feedback control for automobile emission 
control technologies, and airbag and seatbelt for automobile safety technologies. Finally, we 
analyze regression results for the patent set drawn from U.S. firms to determine whether 
federal technology-forcing regulatory regimes caused higher patenting rates for domestic U.S. 
firms after controlling for factors that include the rate of foreign patenting and market share 
held by foreign auto assemblers. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Induced Technological Change in Automobile Emissions Control, Overall Picture 
Results of cross-sectional time series negative binomial regression models for auto 
safety and emission technologies, subsystem level technologies and U.S. firms’ patent sets are 
shown in Table 5 to Table 8 respectively.19  
[Insert Tables 5-8 here] 
Coefficients reported in the tables show that the total automotive patenting variable is 
highly significant even after controlling for other variables and time dummies, suggesting that 
patenting in both the automobile emission control and safety technologies reflects overall 
                                                 
19 We only report regression results with one year lagged cost of compliance variable. We found similar results 
with two year lagged cost of compliance variable. Unreported results are available from authors on request. 
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patenting in automotive technologies during the same periods. The foreign patenting variable is 
also found to be significant (Table 8), implying that foreign patenting could be used as an 
important proxy for measuring the degree of innovation and attractiveness of patent protection 
in the industry (Jaffe and Palmer 1997). The variable, MarketShareForeignFirms, which 
represents the market share held by foreign assemblers in the automobile safety patent set, is 
negative and significant (Table 8). This finding supports the idea that competitive market 
pressures by foreign firms account for automakers’ innovation activities, suggesting that firms 
tend to reduce investments in R&D when faced with significant competitive market pressures 
by foreign firms. Yet, this variable is not significant for automobile emission patent set. Further 
research is needed to resolve this difference in findings. 
The lagged compliance cost variable, LEXPEN1_Safety was found to be significant for 
the safety patent set. As discussed above, inclusion of a compliance cost variable is to estimate 
the potential impact of regulatory stringencies on innovation (Tables 5, 7 and 8). This finding 
thus implies that the regulatory pressures in the form of higher stringencies stimulated 
innovation in the case of automobile safety technologies. Empirical findings using subsystem 
level patenting data (e.g., airbag and seatbelt for safety technologies) also confirm the finding 
that the lagged compliance cost variable is significantly related to firm patenting in automobile 
safety technologies (Table 7). According to the subsystem level regression analysis for 
automobile safety technologies, the coefficient on the lagged compliance cost variable is 
significant for airbag technology but is not significant for seatbelt technology. These findings 
suggest that while the regulatory actions in the form of technology-forcing have significant 
impact on innovation activities involved in the development of automobile airbag technology, 
regulatory stringencies’ impact on innovation in automobile seatbelt technology is minimal—
findings that seemingly comport with common sense.  The findings that the regulatory actions 
have detectable impact on the development of automobile safety technology—especially airbag 
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technology--is somewhat contrary to the claims of previous research, which claimed that the 
introduction of airbags was driven mainly by market forces (Graham 1989; Mannering and 
Winston 1995). Yet, unlike prior studies relied on perceptual research methods such as 
interviews (Graham 1989) and surveys (Mannering and Winston 1995),20 findings of this 
research is strongly supported by systematic empirical analyses using longitudinal patent 
dataset encompassing the key regulatory periods in automobile safety between the late 1960s 
and the early 2000s.  
 Interestingly, while the lagged regulatory compliance cost variable for safety 
technology is significant, the lagged regulatory compliance cost variable for emission control 
technology, LEXPEN1_Emission, is found to be insignificant throughout the different model 
specification (Tables 5, 6 and 8). However, we believe that it would be premature to conclude 
that the regulatory pressures were not effective in driving innovation in automobile emission 
control. In fact, the finding that the compliance variable cost is insignificant is not unexpected. 
Unlike the 1970s and 1990s, the automobile industry involved in the development of emission 
control systems was mostly free from regulatory pressures in the 1980s. Thus, in the case of 
automobile emission control, a plausible connection between the cost of compliances and 
innovation activities in the 1970s and 1990s may not be correctly reflected in the cost of the 
compliance regression coefficient, mainly because the model calculates the average impact of 
cost of compliance on innovation over the entire period of study—rather than in separate 
periods under different policy regimes.  
This suggestion that the regulatory pressures on innovation in automobile emission 
control systems are not correctly captured by a single regulatory compliance cost variable 
(LEXPEN1_Emission) is supported by systematic trends observed in year dummy variables. 
                                                 
20 Surveys directed to study consumers’ willingness to pay for airbags and automakers’ responsiveness to 
consumers’ willingness to pay 
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We observe a systematic pattern in the year dummy coefficients that correspond to stringencies 
mandated under the Amendments to the Clean Air Act in the 1970s and 1990s;  year dummy 
coefficients in the 1970s and the 1990s are positive and significant throughout the models 
(Table 5 and Table 6). Considering that a series of Amendments to the Clean Air Act mandated 
that automakers introduce cars with more advanced emissions control technologies in the 
1970s and 1990s, it is not surprising to observe that year dummies in the 1970s and 1990s turn 
out to be positive and significant. Systematic patterns of year dummy coefficients are 
evidenced in Figure 4 where year dummy coefficients are plotted. One can clearly see that year 
dummies in the patent regression continuously increased after the enactment of key regulatory 
actions for both the automobile emission control and safety technologies, reflecting the non-
trivial impact of technology-forcing regulatory actions in inducing firm innovation activities. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Another piece of evidence that year dummies capture regulatory stringencies can be 
found in the observation that regression coefficients of year dummies increase until a few years 
(one to three years) prior to the mandated product phase-in schedule. Year dummies increase 
until either 1976 or 1977 and decrease over the rest of the decade in the 1970s reflecting the 
phase-in of 90% reduction requirements in the 1980 and 1981 for HC and CO, and NOx 
respectively; similarly, in the 1990s, year dummies increase until either 1992 or 1993 and then 
decrease, reflecting the phase-in of the 1990 CAAA regulation. This finding accords with the 
widely shared view that firms have a higher propensity to innovate in advance of the product 
phase-in date. It is important to remember that stringency levels are associated with vehicle 
models that were to be sold in the market in that year. This is particularly relevant for the 
automobile industry, which typically has long product lead times (Clark and Fujimoto 1991).
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Technology-Forcing Regulations and the Porter Hypothesis 
 Table 8 shows the result of regressions using the U.S. firm patent samples. For the 
emission control patent sample, we find that year dummies from 1970 to 1974 are positive and 
significant, but year dummies in the 1990s are rather weakly related to regulation – only the 
1991 year dummy is significant. This finding seems to suggest that technology-forcing in auto 
emissions regulations caused U.S. firms to innovate comparatively more than foreign 
competitors, yet such “innovation offset” effects occur only to a limited extent prior to 1975. 
Only the 1970 CAAA regime seems to be related to “innovation offset” for U.S. firms. 
The idea that innovation offsets tend to occur in the early phase of market creation was 
discussed by previous theoretical work in the environmental policy and management literature. 
Discussing a pollution-abatement equipment industry within the framework of strategic 
environmental policy, Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) suggest that the realization of the Porter 
hypothesis through gains from learning would be most likely in the early development of an 
environmentally-related industry. This view assumes the presence of learning-by-doing in the 
pollution abatement equipment industry. Greaker (2006) shows that stringent regulations have 
an higher upstream price effect for new pollution abatement equipment,21 and its effect would 
likely be higher when a well-established market for equipment does not yet exist. Schmutzler 
(2001) claims that there is a link between the likelihood of organizational inefficiencies 
responsible for innovation offsets and market environments. He argues that managers would 
typically lack incentives to invest in long-term R&D in an inefficient market, and there would 
then be a negative relationship between the likelihood of innovation offsets and the 
effectiveness of the market. Although this research does not explicitly provide evidence for the 
existence of learning in the equipment industry or in the managers’ incentive scheme involved 
                                                 
21 A stringent environmental regulation tends to increase entry of firms into upstream pollution abatement service 
sector and, thus, causes the supply curve for pollution abatement devices to shift downward (Greaker 2006). 
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in the development of automobile emissions control systems, our empirical findings, along 
with prior theoretical work, provide a key starting point for understanding the complex inter-
relationship between innovation offsets, timing and stringency of the regulations, and the 
overall market environment. 
For our automobile safety patent sample, year dummies from 1965 to 1972 are 
significant and positive (Table 8), confirming the finding from the automobile emission patent 
sample that the innovation offsets tend to occur in the early phase of market creation. What is 
interesting about the automobile safety patent sample is that year dummies from 1986 to 1990 
are also positive and significant (Table 8). According to the history of the development of the 
automobile safety technologies, the market for the automobile airbag system did not really 
emerge until the late 1980s despite the fact that the first installation of the airbag system for 
automobiles occurred in the early 1970s.22 Thus, the finding that year dummy coefficients are 
also positive and significant from 1986 to 1990 reflects the establishment of an airbag market 
for automobiles in the late 1980s.  This observation, however, in no way suggests that the 
establishment of a market of airbags in the late 1980s vitiates the effectiveness of early 
technology-forcing regulation in the invention and development of air bags and related systems.   
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented quantitative empirical evidence that technology-forcing 
regulations imposed on the automobile industry stimulated innovation in pollution abatement 
and safety equipment. In our models, we find a statistically significant relationship between the 
                                                 
22 General Motors and Ford first offered automobiles with airbags for fleet tests in 1973 and 1971 respectively, 
and General Motors started to manufacturer Cadillac, Oldsmobile and Buicks equipped with airbags for sale in 
1974. Major auto assemblers such as GM and Ford dropped offering optional airbags in the late 1970s due to poor 
sales performances and controversies over the safety of the airbag systems for the out-of-position occupants. 
Airbags in automobiles reemerged in the 1988 when Chrysler started to install driver airbags as standard 
equipment for all its domestic cars (Graham 1989). 
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cost of compliance variable and the patenting activities for the innovation in automobile safety 
technologies. This finding provides important evidence that the technology-forcing regulatory 
actions have had a detectable impact on the innovation activities related to the development of 
automobile safety technologies. However, we find no significant relationship between the cost 
of compliance variable and the regulatory stringency in the case of automobile emission 
control technologies. Considering the fact that the period of no additional regulations (during 
the 1980s) occupies approximately 30% of the entire period of the study, the regression 
coefficient of the cost of compliance—which shows an averaged correlation between the 
stringency and patenting activity over the entire period of the study—would likely 
underestimate the impact of regulation in the adjacent decades of the 1970s and 1990s. 
Importantly, we find some evidence for a significant relationship between regulatory stringency 
and patenting activity from a systematic pattern observed in year dummies. In a model where 
we controlled for market pressures, overall patenting trends in automotive technologies, and 
capital expenditures for pollution abatement devices, the coefficients of year dummies—the 
inclusion of which is intended to capture any time-dependent R&D determinants—remain 
significant only during the periods that correspond to regulatory regimes in the 1970s and 
1990s. We also observed similar systematic patterns in year dummies with our automobile 
safety patent sample as well.  
Our study offers several insights regarding the relationship between performance-
based regulatory standards and the industry’s innovative responses. First, properly designed 
command-and-control (CAC) type regulations can provide incentives for R&D. Empirical 
findings that CAC regulations provide incentives for R&D was also reported by Taylor, Rubin 
and Hounshell (2005) and Popp (2003) for the case of SO2 control. Popp (2003) shows that 
technology-based CAC regulations used for SO2 emissions control indeed led to R&D efforts 
toward lowering the cost of complying with the regulations. We do not provide here any 
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additional set of evidence that CAC regulations provide greater R&D incentives than market-
based approaches, but we would stress that properly designed CAC regulation can induce 
sufficient technological change to meet regulatory environmental goals.  
Second, we suspect that CAC regulations, specifically performance-based CAC 
regulations, can be a useful regulatory tool to induce radical technological change—that is new 
technology that is well beyond the far more common incremental innovation. Prior theoretical 
studies that compared the effectiveness of regulatory tools and R&D incentives have favored 
market-based approaches (e.g. Jung, Krutilla and Boyd, 1996; Requate and Unold, 2003). 
However, Jones and Klassen (2002) claim that radical technologies tend to be difficult to 
introduce even if clear incentives for their adoption exist since radical innovations tend to be 
more competence-destroying for incumbent firms. Incumbent firms’ reluctance to adopt radical 
technologies is clearly evident in the history of automobile emissions control in the U.S. 
Automakers at first were unwilling to adopt add-in type catalytic converters, and instead 
pursued modifying existing engine components in their attempts to reduce tailpipe emissions 
(Mondt 2000). Yet, the stringency of emission control, especially the requirement that NOx be 
controlled to less than 1.0 gram per mile, forced automakers to surrender their incremental 
innovation approach in the early 1970s of reducing emission control using engine 
modifications. A similar case of the emergence of radical technology in response to regulatory 
forcing can be found with California’s initiative in stimulating the development of cleaner cars 
that encompass categories of vehicles from low-emission vehicles (LEVs) to zero-emission 
vehicles (ZEVs) (Schot, Hoogma and Elzen, 1994). To automakers, realization of ZEV 
represents another case of competence-destroying radical technological change since the 
introduction of the first catalytic converters in 1975: ZEV technologies require a fundamentally 
different drive-train mechanism from conventional internal combustion engine vehicles. 
Nevertheless, California’s regulation that mandated a phase-in of ZEV not only induced 
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development of ZEVs23, but it also catalyzed the development of super ultra-low emission 
vehicles (SULEVs), such as battery-equipped hybrid vehicles (Majumdar 2005).  
Third, observations that stringent, technology-forcing regulation drove technological 
innovation clearly supports the view that regulation stringency is a key determinant for the 
degree of induced technological change (Ashford, Ayers and Stone, 1993). More interestingly, 
we acknowledge that adoption of radically new technologies under high regulatory stringency 
may imply changes in the direction of future technological innovation. Further, our finding that 
suppliers’ innovative responses to regulatory stringency in the 1970s differed from their 
responses in the 1990s suggests that understanding characteristics of technological evolution 
and the direction of technological change may have important implications for the success of 
regulation for inducing technological change. Yet, our understanding is limited on how radical 
technologies within regulatory environments compete and get selected from among competing 
technological options. Thus, future studies that examine potential connections between 
regulatory stringency and the selection mechanism among a variety of competing technological 
options may further enhance our understanding regarding the impact of regulatory stringencies 
on innovation.  
Our finding that U.S. firms’ innovative activities were significant under the U.S. auto-
emissions regulations (during the 1970 CAAA regime) and safety standards (during the 1966 
MVSA and the 1984 Reinstatement of Passive Restraint Rule) -- even after we controlled for 
foreign patents, provides important evidence for the Porter hypothesis. In other words, U.S. 
auto-emissions and safety standards caused U.S. firms to become comparatively more 
innovative than foreign competitors. However, our findings are limited in offering any 
                                                 
23 Yet, implementation of ZEVs in California is limited due to the status of technology development in the U.S 
automobile industry. California’s Air Resource Board and the auto industry are going through a series of revisions 
to ZEV and partial ZEV mandates to accommodate the realities of technological development in the industry 
(Majumdar 2005). 
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additional evidence to infer further whether firms’ increased innovative activities in response to 
regulatory pressures came at the expense of their other R&D programs. Based on the fact that 
auto-emissions standards are performance-based, outcome-oriented regulations, we can 
nevertheless claim that our study supports a “narrow” version of the Porter hypothesis, that is, 
“certain types of environmental regulation stimulate innovation (Jaffe and Palmer 1997, pg. 
601).” According to Rugman and Verbeke (1998), the Porter hypothesis only applies to 
countries that possess a large domestic market (such as the U.S.) and whose governments have 
a significant influence on international regulation trends. Thus, following Rugman and 
Verbeke’s argument, the U.S. auto industry—which has the most stringent auto-emissions and 
safety standards—is likely to benefit (or have benefited) from the regulations studied here, 
assuming that differences in stringencies of auto emissions and safety standards of U.S. and 
other countries diminish over time (Homeister 2001). In the case of U.S. auto-emissions 
regulations, firms in the specialty chemicals and electronics industries entered the market for 
auto emissions control technologies such as catalysts, substrates, and electronics sensors. 
Literature in the environmental strategy suggests that suppliers’ incentives in entering the 
environmentally regulated industry could be understood from the point of view of the resource-
based theory of the firm (Hart 1995). Firms that possess proactive strategies toward 
environmental issues tend to invest early in new pollution prevention technologies to gain 
competitive advantages over their rivals as proactive firms because first (or early) movers may 
benefit from proprietary cost-reducing or sales-enhancing technologies (Shrivastava 1995; 
Nehrt 1996; Russo and Fouts 1997; Aragon-Correa 1998; Klassen and Whybark 1999). 
Following the stream of research in environmental strategy, an extension of this paper that 
examines in detail how suppliers’ existing capabilities, their decisions to diversify (or to enter 
de novo) into an upstream equipment industry sector relevant to auto emissions and safety and 
their long-term performance would be of great interest. One key limitation of this paper is that 
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we relied on aggregated industry-level patenting activities; thus, factors that are associated with 
firm level unobservable heterogeneities are not properly accounted for. Firms may have 
different strategies in terms of technological investments, and firms’ patent strategies may even 
differ depending on their R&D intensities (Arundel and Kabla 1998). Firms from different 
countries may also have different propensities to patent. Inclusion of firm fixed effect models 
eliminates biases from those firm heterogeneities. Future research that explores how key 
assemblers and suppliers involved in automobile safety and emission-control development 
collectively reacted to regulatory pressures; the complex inter-relationships among the 
evolution of formation of networks of key players; the direction of knowledge flow in these 
networks; and the timing and stringency of regulatory pressures would significantly advance 
our understanding of technology-forcing regulations. 
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TABLE 1 
Key Legislative History for Automobile Emission and Safety Control 
 
Period Emission Control Safety 
1960s The 1965 Clean Air Act Amendments 
(Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act) 
1.  Directed the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) to set emission standards for HC and 
CO emissions for the 1968 model year cars and light-
duty trucks.  
The 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA) 
1. Created the National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB) 
2. The MVSA required NHSB to set standards by Jan. 31, 1968 
1970s The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments 
1.  Instructed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to set standards for HC, CO and NOx for automobiles 
2.  The Act called for 90 percent reductions in 
automotive emissions (0.41 g/mi for HC, 3.4 g/mi for 
CO for new automobiles in 1975, which was later 
revised in 1974)  
3.  The NOx emission standard was set at 0.41g/mi to 
be met by 1976, which was later revised in 1977 
The Highway Safety Act of 1970 
1. Created the National Highway Transportation Safety Bureau 
(NHTSA) 
2.  NHTSA adopted and amended Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
208, Occupant crash protection.  NHTSA mandated passive 
restraints on all vehicles by Jan. 1973, which was delayed to July 
1973. The standard also mandated that certified airbags would not 
inflict certain “injuries” to a 5’9” dummy in a frontal barrier crash 
at any speed up to and including 30 mph and frontal angles up to 
30 degrees. 
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 
1.  Congress delayed the HC standard until 1980, and 
the CO and NOx standards to 1981 (0.41 g/mi for HC, 
3.4 g/mi for CO, and 1.0 g/mi for NOx)  
The Highway Safety Act of 1973 
1.  Provided bonus of 25% of federal incentive grant to states that 
enacted a compulsory seat belt use law. 
2.  Provided bonus of 25% of federal incentive grant to states 
achieving major reductions in hwy. death rates. 
1980s Inspection and Maintenance programs (1983) 
1.  Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) programs are 
established in 64 cities nationwide  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cancellation (1981) and reinstatement (1984) of passive-restraints 
rule  
1.  Under Reagan Administration regulatory reform, NHTSA 
canceled passive-restraints standard and called for large-scale 
safety belt use. 
2.  The Supreme Court reversed DOT’s 1981 revocation of the 
passive restraints requirements of standard 208 and directed 
NHTSA to review the case for airbags (1983). 
3. NHTSA reinstated the passive-restraints rule 
requiring passive restraints be installed in 10%, 25%, 40% and 
100% of 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 and later models respectively 
(1984). 
1990s The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
1.  Congress required further reductions in HC, CO, 
NOx and particulate emissions.   
2.  Amendments introduced comprehensive programs 
for; more stringent emission testing procedures; 
expanded I/M programs; new vehicles technologies & 
clean fuel programs; transportation management 
provisions; and possible regulations of emissions from 
non-road vehicles. 
The Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) 
(1991)  
1.  Requires all passenger cars manufactured on or after 
September 1, 1997, and light trucks manufactured on or after 
September 1, 1998, to have drive and passenger airbags, plus 
manual lap-shoulder belts. 
The National Low Emission Vehicle (NLEV) program 
(1997) 
1.  The program is designed to adopt more stringent 
California LEV program nationwide, started initially 
with northeast ozone transport regions.  
2.   Manufacturers have the option of not complying to 
NLEV program yet manufacturers have agreed to 
comply to this program as EPA and the states indicated 
that they provide manufacturers with regulatory stability. 
3.   NLEV is enforceable once  manufacturers are 
committed to the program 
4.   NLEV continues through MY2003, after which it 
will be replaced by Tier 2 standard 
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) 
(1998) 
Key congressional mandates of TEA-21: 
1.  Improved protection for all sizes of occupants 
2.  Airbag systems that minimize risks of death and injury posed 
by airbags to infants, children and others  
3.  Protection for unbelted occupants 
4.  Advanced technologies: TEA-21 authorized 
NHTSA to require the use of “advanced airbags,” which 
incorporates new technology and engineering beyond the current 
state of art 
5.  Rapid phase-in dates requiring advanced airbags must be 
available as soon as practicable. 
-  Phase-in to begin on September 1, 2002 or no later than 
September 1, 2003 
-  Completion of phase-in by September 1, 2005 or by September 
2, 2006 (if phase-in began by 2003) 
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TABLE 2 
U.S. Classes and Subclasses for Automobile Emissions Control Technology Patents 
 
USPC 
Class/Subclasses 
Definition of USPC Class/Subclasses 
60/274, 276-278 
 
Class 60, the “Power Plants” includes the subclasses representing “Internal 
combustion engine with treatment or handling of exhaust gas” 
422/174, 179-180 Class 422, the “Chemical apparatus and  process disinfecting, 
Deodorizing, preserving, or sterilizing” includes the subclasses which 
describes apparatus, the chemical reactor, supporting catalytic processes for 
waste gases such as NOx and CO. 
423/213.2, 213.5, 
213.7 
Class 423, the “Chemistry of inorganic compounds” includes subclasses 
which represents utilizing the transition elements as catalyst to treat exhaust 
from internal-combustion engine 
502/302-304 Class 502, the “Catalyst, solid sorbent, or support therefore: product or 
process making”, include subclasses that represents catalysts comprising a 
lanthanide series metals or transition metals. 
428/116 Class 428, the “Stock materials or miscellaneous articles” include subclass 
representing honey-comb like structural body for catalytic converters 
73/116, 117.3, 
118.1 
Class 73, the “Measuring and testing” include subclasses representing 
testing of motor, engine and auxiliary units such as catalytic converter to 
ensure optimal operations. 
29/890 Class 29, the “Metal working” include subclass representing catalytic 
device making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44
TABLE 3 
Key U.S. Classes and Subclasses for Automobile Safety Technology Patents 
 
Technology 
Types 
USPC 
Class/Subclasses 
Definition of USPC Class/Subclasses 
Impact 293/ 2, 102-109, 
115-136 
 
Class 293: Vehicle fenders with car control, and buffers 
and bumper type.  
Steering 
column 
74/492-492 
 
Class 74: Machine element and mechanism- Control level 
and linkage system, steering posts 
Seat 297/216.1-
216.19 
Class 297: Chairs and seats- Crash seat 
Seatbelt 242/372-373 Class 242: Winding, tensioning, or guiding-.material 
engaging, tension responsive etc., 
Airbag 149/1, 10, 45-46 
180/116-120 
Class 149: Explosive and thermic compositions or 
charges 
Class 180: Surface effect vehicles-having propulsion or 
control means 
Theft 
protection 
70/163-166, 184-
189 
340/ 5.2 
Class 70: Locks-external locking device, level carried 
lock 
Class 340: Communications, electrical - authorized 
control-entry into an area. 
Warning 116/3 Class 116: Signals and indicators 
Brake 188/ 68-75 
74/502-506, 512, 
516 
Class 188: Brakes-wheels 
Class 74: Machine element and mechanism-foot 
operated, accelerator, signal,  
 
Tire 152/415-418 
340/440 
Class 152: Resilient tires and wheels- inflating devices 
Class 340: Communications, electrical -tilt, imbalance 
Head 
Restraints 
297/216.12-
216.13 
Class 297: Chairs and seats-force absorbing means 
incorporated into headrest area, into back 
Fuel System 137/38-39 Class 137: Fluid handling – control by inertia system  
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TABLE 5 
Regression Coefficients for Negative Binomial Models, Auto Safety & Emission Patent Set 
PATENT_AUTO 0.001 *** ( 0.000 ) 0.002 *** ( 3E-04 )
LEXPEN1_Safety 0.356 ** ( 0.123 )
LEXPEN1_Emission -0.085 ( 0.088 )
Constant 2.468 *** ( 0.656 ) 1.673 *** ( 0.359 )
1965 -1.343 *** ( 0.219 )
1966 -0.677 *** ( 0.171 )
1967 -0.071 ( 0.142 )
1968 -0.047 ( 0.142 ) -1.909 * ( 0.744 )
1969 - -0.928 * ( 0.442 )
1970 -0.114 ( 0.127 )
1971 0.478 *** ( 0.103 ) 0.534 * ( 0.268 )
1972 0.543 *** ( 0.100 ) 1.050 *** ( 0.219 )
1973 0.509 *** ( 0.094 ) 0.950 *** ( 0.211 )
1974 0.140 ( 0.103 ) 1.279 *** ( 0.195 )
1975 -0.117 ( 0.113 ) 0.928 *** ( 0.222 )
1976 -0.354 ** ( 0.124 ) 1.490 *** ( 0.275 )
1977 -0.460 *** ( 0.126 ) 1.378 *** ( 0.265 )
1978 -0.234 * ( 0.116 ) 0.952 ** ( 0.274 )
1979 0.081 ( 0.107 ) 0.938 ** ( 0.287 )
1980 -0.169 ( 0.112 ) 0.311 ( 0.295 )
1981 -0.341 ** ( 0.125 ) 0.281 ( 0.351 )
1982 -0.613 *** ( 0.134 ) 0.561 + ( 0.31 )
1983 -0.610 *** ( 0.139 )
1984 -0.792 *** ( 0.134 ) -0.247 ( 0.273 )
1985 -0.447 *** ( 0.117 ) -0.491 + ( 0.286 )
1986 -0.250 * ( 0.111 ) 0.129 ( 0.273 )
1987 -0.624 *** ( 0.124 ) -0.118 ( 0.235 )
1988 -0.470 *** ( 0.110 ) -0.078 ( 0.21 )
1989 -0.128 ( 0.093 ) 0.042 ( 0.216 )
1990 -0.063 ( 0.089 ) 0.574 ** ( 0.196 )
1991 -0.017 ( 0.094 ) 1.011 *** ( 0.185 )
1992 - 1.300 *** ( 0.202 )
1993 0.143 ( 0.091 ) 1.351 *** ( 0.177 )
1994 0.164 * ( 0.079 ) 0.936 *** ( 0.134 )
1995 0.162 * ( 0.079 ) 0.761 *** ( 0.12 )
1996 0.213 ** ( 0.078 ) 0.572 *** ( 0.118 )
1997 0.236 ** ( 0.068 ) 0.240 * ( 0.109 )
1998 0.184 ** ( 0.070 )
1999 0.238 *** ( 0.068 )
2000 0.121 + ( 0.065 )
Pseudo R2 0.434 0.453
Log Likelihood                    -126.43 -87.96
N 6357 2108
Time dummies
Variable Dependent Variables
  PATENT_SAFETY           PATENT_EMISSION
 
          Standard errors are in parentheses 
     Some of year dummies dropped automatically due to multicollinearity 
     +p <0.1; *p<0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001 
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TABLE 6 
Regression Coefficients for Negative Binomial Models,  
Key auto emissions subsystems’ patents: catalysts & electronics  
PATENT_AUTO 0.001 ** ( 0.000 ) 0.003 *** ( 1E-03 )
LEXPEN1_Emission 0.004 ( 0.109 ) 0.013 ( 0.345 )
Constant 1.601 ** ( 0.502 ) -2.384 ( 1.552 )
1968 -1.449 + ( 0.775 ) -
1969 - -
1970 - -
1971 -0.099 ( 0.434 ) 1.744 + ( 1.003 )
1972 1.024 ** ( 0.308 ) 2.131 * ( 0.841 )
1973 1.138 *** ( 0.292 ) 1.640 * ( 0.821 )
1974 0.934 ** ( 0.280 ) 2.388 ** ( 0.703 )
1975 0.578 + ( 0.316 ) 1.979 * ( 0.763 )
1976 0.884 * ( 0.344 ) 3.025 ** ( 0.908 )
1977 0.755 * ( 0.339 ) 2.731 ** ( 0.872 )
1978 0.432 ( 0.356 ) 1.968 * ( 0.883 )
1979 0.036 ( 0.406 ) 1.878 * ( 0.929 )
1980 0.038 ( 0.381 ) 0.201 ( 1.055 )
1981 -0.117 ( 0.446 ) 1.570 ( 1.039 )
1982 -0.113 ( 0.425 ) -0.385 ( 1.342 )
1983 - -
1984 -0.144 ( 0.350 ) -0.283 ( 0.866 )
1985 -0.796 + ( 0.433 ) -0.105 ( 0.809 )
1986 0.304 ( 0.329 ) 0.238 ( 0.882 )
1987 -0.108 ( 0.324 ) -0.357 ( 0.757 )
1988 0.282 ( 0.272 ) -0.917 ( 0.762 )
1989 0.368 ( 0.275 ) -0.253 ( 0.699 )
1990 0.459 + ( 0.271 ) 0.826 ( 0.612 )
1991 0.668 * ( 0.260 ) 1.681 ** ( 0.585 )
1992 0.667 * ( 0.280 ) 2.088 ** ( 0.664 )
1993 0.115 ( 0.299 ) 2.182 *** ( 0.574 )
1994 0.201 ( 0.252 ) 1.464 *** ( 0.381 )
1995 0.280 ( 0.236 ) 1.077 *** ( 0.307 )
1996 0.293 ( 0.232 ) 0.982 *** ( 0.272 )
1997 0.236 ( 0.235 ) 0.185 ( 0.193 )
1998 - -
Pseudo R2 0.405 0.500
Log Likelihood -71.12 -60.63
N 635 574
Time dummies
Variable                                      Dependent Variables
                Catalysts    Electronic Feedback Contro
 
  Standard errors are in parentheses 
   Some of year dummies dropped automatically due to multicollinearity 
   +p <0.1; *p<0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001 
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TABLE 7 
Regression Coefficients for Negative Binomial Models,  
Key auto safety subsystems’ patents: airbag & seatbelt  
PATENT_AUTO 0.005 *** ( 0.0002 ) 0.001 ( 0.0001 )
LEXPEN1_Safety 0.907 *** ( 0.227 ) 0.386 ( 0.281 )
Constant -1.819 ( 1.267 ) 0.943 ( 1.485 )
1965 - -0.953 * ( 0.414 )
1966 -2.402 ** ( 0.736 ) -0.084 ( 0.314 )
1967 0.027 ( 0.293 ) -0.038 ( 0.31 )
1968 -0.082 ( 0.302 ) -0.025 ( 0.309 )
1969 - -
1970 0.183 ( 0.238 ) -0.437 ( 0.314 )
1971 0.969 *** ( 0.189 ) 0.414 + ( 0.234 )
1972 0.769 *** ( 0.193 ) 0.694 ** ( 0.216 )
1973 0.398 * ( 0.191 ) 0.886 *** ( 0.195 )
1974 -0.481 * ( 0.237 ) 0.795 *** ( 0.195 )
1975 -0.706 ** ( 0.256 ) 0.544 ** ( 0.21 )
1976 -1.597 *** ( 0.375 ) 0.439 * ( 0.219 )
1977 -1.338 *** ( 0.325 ) 0.338 ( 0.22 )
1978 -1.02 *** ( 0.286 ) 0.466 * ( 0.211 )
1979 -0.991 ** ( 0.286 ) 0.827 *** ( 0.197 )
1980 -1.243 *** ( 0.314 ) 0.637 ** ( 0.2 )
1981 -1.466 *** ( 0.357 ) 0.315 ( 0.228 )
1982 -1.223 *** ( 0.314 ) 0.147 ( 0.231 )
1983 -2.556 *** ( 0.591 ) 0.318 ( 0.229 )
1984 -1.538 *** ( 0.341 ) -0.008 ( 0.234 )
1985 -1.909 *** ( 0.4 ) 0.504 * ( 0.202 )
1986 -1.172 *** ( 0.296 ) 0.603 ** ( 0.196 )
1987 -1.497 *** ( 0.329 ) 0.164 ( 0.223 )
1988 -0.823 *** ( 0.231 ) 0.214 ( 0.206 )
1989 -0.299 + ( 0.176 ) 0.41 * ( 0.183 )
1990 0.091 ( 0.145 ) 0.166 ( 0.194 )
1991 0.007 ( 0.141 ) 0.261 ( 0.206 )
1992 - -
1993 0.27 * ( 0.133 ) -0.141 ( 0.231 )
1994 0.249 * ( 0.116 ) 0.123 ( 0.194 )
1995 0.295 * ( 0.115 ) -0.024 ( 0.204 )
1996 0.22 + ( 0.115 ) -0.046 ( 0.204 )
1997 0.278 ** ( 0.099 ) 0.232 ( 0.174 )
1998 0.287 ** ( 0.102 ) 0.216 ( 0.179 )
1999 0.354 *** ( 0.097 ) 0.103 ( 0.182 )
2000 0.103 ( 0.093 ) 0.4 * ( 0.172 )
Pseudo R2 0.497 0.342
Log Likelihood -97.04 -101.474
N 2342 1483
Time dummies
Variable Dependent Variables
Airbag Seatbelt
 
   Standard errors are in parentheses 
    Some of year dummies dropped automatically due to multicollinearity 
    +p <0.1; *p<0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001 
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TABLE 8 
Regression Coefficients for Negative Binomial Models, U.S. firms’ patents 
MS_FOREIGN -0.057 *** ( 0.013 ) 0.01558 ( 0.018 )
PATENT_FOREIGN 0.009 *** ( 0.002 ) 0.00967 ** ( 0.004 )
PATENT_AUTO 0.0002 ( 0.0003 ) 0.0003 ( 0.000 )
LEXPEN1_Safety 2.239 *** ( 0.233 )
LEXPEN1_Emission -0.05931 ( 0.092 )
Constant -8.301 *** ( 1.247 ) 2.4513 *** ( 0.445 )
1965 -
1966 0.751 ** ( 0.255 )
1967 1.215 *** ( 0.214 )
1968 0.995 *** ( 0.203 ) -1.9306 * ( 0.750 )
1969 0.697 ** ( 0.204 ) -0.89378 + ( 0.479 )
1970 1.130 *** ( 0.192 )
1971 0.688 *** ( 0.128 ) 0.55696 + ( 0.298 )
1972 0.419 ** ( 0.129 ) 0.93461 *** ( 0.255 )
1973 - 0.74207 ** ( 0.272 )
1974 -0.191 ( 0.138 ) 0.80375 ** ( 0.241 )
1975 -0.333 * ( 0.157 ) 0.10853 ( 0.271 )
1976 -0.703 *** ( 0.185 )
1977 -0.158 ( 0.175 ) -0.05011 ( 0.299 )
1978 0.330 * ( 0.162 ) -0.4784 ( 0.362 )
1979 -0.112 ( 0.171 ) -0.08588 ( 0.295 )
1980 0.428 * ( 0.189 ) -0.57994 ( 0.355 )
1981 - -0.86433 * ( 0.425 )
1982 0.122 ( 0.234 ) -1.15328 ** ( 0.442 )
1983 0.107 ( 0.234 ) -0.39494 ( 0.380 )
1984 0.006 ( 0.223 ) -0.59109 ( 0.386 )
1985 0.190 ( 0.195 ) -0.97315 * ( 0.438 )
1986 0.457 * ( 0.197 ) -0.31936 ( 0.326 )
1987 0.694 ** ( 0.239 )
1988 0.495 * ( 0.191 ) -0.12457 ( 0.303 )
1989 0.364 * ( 0.154 ) -0.26787 ( 0.299 )
1990 0.506 ** ( 0.153 ) -0.02933 ( 0.233 )
1991 0.044 ( 0.135 ) 0.52816 ** ( 0.188 )
1992 0.269 + ( 0.142 )
1993 0.168 ( 0.117 ) 0.15672 ( 0.201 )
1994 0.374 *** ( 0.095 ) -0.20743 ( 0.202 )
1995 - 0.01069 ( 0.176 )
1996 -0.135 ( 0.093 ) -0.34431 + ( 0.190 )
1997 -0.004 ( 0.078 )
1998 -0.044 ( 0.080 ) -0.16484 ( 0.188 )
1999 -0.227 * ( 0.094 )
2000 -0.110 ( 0.081 )
Pseudo R2 0.444 0.427
-116.59 -75.487
N 4022 865
Log Likelihood
Variable
Time dummies
  PATENT_SAFETY _USFIRMS PATENT_EMISSION_USFIRMS
                                    Dependent Variables
 
 Standard errors are in parentheses 
 Some of year dummies dropped automatically due to multicollinearity 
 +p <0.1; *p<0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001 
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FIGURE 1 
Federal Automotive Emission Standards for the Period 1970 to 2004 and Introduction of 
Emission Control Technologies 
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The permitted emission levels of all three critical pollutants decreased throughout the seventies. 
By 1981, emission requirements had reached one tenth of the original 1970 value.  Increased 
stringency is again observed in 1994 with the implementation of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 (1990CAAA).  Automobile manufacturers faced nationwide 
implementation of National Low Emission Vehicle (NLEV) program in 2001 and Tier II 
standards in 2004. As stringency increased, the automotive industry introduced new emission 
control technologies. Source:  (Lee 2004). 
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Figure 1. Patent Trend in Automobile Emission 
Control and Safety: 1965 - 2002
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FIGURE 2 
Patent Trend in Automobile Emission Control and Safety: 1965 - 2002 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Patenting activities in automobile (a) Emissions control and (b) Safety technologies 
in four sub-technology categories 
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FIGURE 4 
Regression coefficients for year dummy variables: (a) Emission control and 
(b) Safety automobile sub-technology systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
CAAA1970: the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1970 
CAAA1990: the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990 
1966 MVSA: Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 
1970 HAS: the Highway Safety Act of 1973 
1984 PRR: Reinstatement of Passive Restraints Rule of 1984 
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